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ABSTRACT Using a range of international examples, this article examines the ways in
which members of the black and minority ethnic population continue to be viewed as
problematic and deviant, challenging the claim that we are now living in a post-race state. The
article considers how race and racism are still in reality, used to socially order society—and
speciﬁcally criminalize those black and minority ethnic groups of (real or perceived) Muslim
background—what I call “brown bodies”. Turning its focus to the United Kingdom, although
offering an analysis applicable to other countries with similar racialized conditions, the article
discusses how sub-measures under current counter-terror discourse not only serve to control
and regulate Muslim populations, but more so, the civilizing undertone of its Western (or,
British) values and national security narrative continue to normalize and perpetuate anti-
Muslim sentiment and construct Muslims as “suspect” communities at every possible
opportunity. This process draws on a “post-colonial fantasy” and re-uses established prac-
tices of “race-consumption” to control brown bodies. This ensures that anti-Muslim racism
remains a key feature of contemporary British society. The article ends noting its support for
that body of literature that critiques the claim that we are now living in a post-race state.
This article is published as part of a collection on racism in counter-terrorism and surveillance
discourse.
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Introduction
The aim of this article is to examine the claim that we arenow living in a post-race society where racial equality hasbeen achieved and anti-discrimination measures have
become redundant. The article uses the case of the UK counter-
terror context and some of its widely adopted sub-measures, to
illustrate how “brown” members of the black and minority ethnic
(BME) population, continue to be viewed as problematic and
deviant, within a post-race era. To test the claim of a post-race
state, the article begins by drawing on international examples to
illustrate the continued use of a racialized narrative that
constructs some BMEs as problematic, deviant and undesirable.
Far from achieving a post-race state, it is argued that race and
racism are in reality, still used to socially order society and now
more than ever is being used to speciﬁcally criminalize those
BME groups of (real or perceived) Muslim background—what I
call “brown bodies” (Patel, 2012). This is a term I use to refer to
all those of real or perceived membership of the Muslim faith,
who (regardless of any evidence of illegal behaviour) are marked
out as members of a “suspect community” (Patel, 2012: 212). It is
important to note here that use of the term “brown body/ies”
takes from wider discussions of “browning” processes (Patel,
2017). It is a term used to describe racialized processes, that is,
socially constructed racial categorizations informed by socio-
political conditions. The term includes, but is not restricted to
those of middle Eastern appearance, or of South Asian or Arabic
heritage, as well as others outside of this phenotypical category,
that is, white converts to Islam. Therefore, although informed by
phenotypical features, it is not solely conﬁned to this feature.
With a focus on the United Kingdom, or more speciﬁcally,
Britain, although offering a comment on other countries that also
claim a post-race state, it is argued that counter-terror sub-
measures control and regulate brown bodies, and does so
effectively with support from mainstream society, because of
use of a civilizing undertone based on colonial ideas about
civilized society, Western (or, British) values and democracy.
Combined with a narrative about national security and the
urgency of taking extreme action, these narratives normalize and
perpetuate anti-Muslim sentiment and construct Muslims and
other brown bodies, as “suspect” communities at every possible
opportunity, and certainly from an earlier age than was
previously the case.
Anti-Muslim racism in a post-race state
Racism and its associated discriminations are not individual
biases. Neither are they practices of past eras. Racism is varied,
wide-reaching, normative and thriving in contemporary society.
Despite their differences, both Critical race theory and Post-
colonial theory have played an important role in advancing our
social scientiﬁc understanding of how “race” and racism is
constructed and used to sustain a hierarchy of social order and
associated practices of racial oppression. Critical race theorists,
such as Derek Bell and Kimberle Crenshaw, and earlier scholars
aligned with the perspective, Frederick Douglass, Sojourner Truth
and W.E.B. Du Bois, suggested that society is full of anti-black
racialized meanings, which operate at all levels of society. These
racialized meanings are not only found in individual minds, but
in social relationships and structural practices. There is therefore
a more systematic operation of racism that is being delivered
through social, economic and political means. This is still a valid
point that is often ignored when examining instances of race-hate
in contemporary society.
In addition, Postcolonial theorists, (see Said, 1979 and
Fanon, 1967) have sought to understand the cultural legacy
of colonialism and imperialism, especially for those native
populations who were subjected to “civilizing” control measures
and economic exploitation. Said (1979) argued that “the West”
(or “Occident”) had for centuries deﬁned itself through portray-
ing the Eastern “Orient” as its polar-opposite (1–3). In his
analysis of material produced in the West during the colonial
period, Said found a disturbing and fantastical geography of West
vs. East, one in which the West’s depiction of itself as “civilized”
and “advanced” depended on the degradation of Asian and
Middle Eastern cultures as “barbaric” and “backwards.” (1979:
72). In this article, I argue that the West vs. East fantastical re-
presentation continues to be used to control and regulate “brown
bodies”. There is though, a very speciﬁc way in which this is done
in the post-race era.
The claim that we are now living in post-race times attempts to
devoid claims of race-making and racism. It is a claim that is
based on the view that society has progressed so far with race
equality, that speciﬁc considerations of racialized discrimination
are now obsolete. To support this claim, BME presence and
progress in a variety of areas have been highlighted, with the
ultimate illustration being the inauguration of Barack Hussein
Obama as the President of the United States of America in 2009—
ironically, the country that in recent years has witnessed an
increase in the number of BME deaths at the hands of the police
and others claiming to undertake “policing” work, for example,
Michael Brown, Deravis “Caine” Rogers, Terence Crutcher, and
Trayvon Martin, to name a few—with the death of the last
triggering the Black Lives Matter movement (Black Lives Matter,
2012). Trayvon Martin was a 17-year-old African American who
was fatally shot by George Zimmerman, an armed neighbourhood
watch volunteer, in Sanford, Florida in February 2012. Zimmer-
man was later acquitted of manslaughter and second-degree
murder, although allegations were rife of him being motivated by
racism and having racially proﬁled Martin. Barack Obama
inadvertently added to this suggestion in his comment to reporters
following the shooting: “When I think about this boy, I think about
my own kids, and I think every parent in America should be able
to understand why it is absolutely imperative that we investigate
every aspect of this … If I had a son, he would look like Trayvon.”
(President Obama, cited in The Guardian, 2012). The Martin case
and others like it, challenges the idea of a non-racially biased state.
It demonstrates that structural racism remains a key feature of
society, and that race not only matters, but for many, it remains a
matter of life and death (Lee, 2013).
This article discusses how the claim to a post-race state is not
only incorrect, but it is in fact more damaging for BME
populations, who are still at greater risk of discriminatory
practices. As I have argued in other work (Patel, 2017),
society not only remains marked out by racialized processes,
but claims to a post-race state have allowed racially biased
practices to unapologetically and unashamedly thrive. It does this
by ﬁrst presenting discriminations as something emerging
from naturally occurring segregation practices. However, this
article contests the idea of “natural segregation”, and instead
refers to the work of Bonilla-Silva (2003: 277) who noted
that there is a “white belief” that “residential and school
segregation, friendship, and attraction are natural, raceless
occurrences”, yet social scientiﬁc research has found that in fact
all these issues are affected by race. Although legally abolished,
racial-segregation is still encouraged and enforced through a
range of “informal” means, that are micro, organized and
systematic (Dixon and Durrheim, 2003: 19). It is suggested here
that although a small percentage of individuals may hold
this “white belief ”, it is more likely that claims of “natural
segregation” are used as a convenient way to socially exclude and
victimize BMEs.
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Also, occurring in the post-race state is the increased
categorization, surveillance and control of some populations
using the claim of “a measured response” to increased security
concerns. This claim suggests that although there may be a
heavier focus on members of the Muslim population, this is
proportionate to the threat, and that aside, this level of response
does not even constitute actual racism, given that Muslims
are not perceived to be a “race”. Here there emerges a denial of
racism by making distinctions between Islamophobia and
racism, and misinterpreting the category of the latter. Islamo-
phobia is considered to be a fear of the religion of Islam (ideas
and practices), rather than hostility towards a racial group per se
(racism) (Halliday, 1999, cited in Garner, 2010: 165). And, given
that Muslims are not considered to be a group deﬁned by race,
the perception is that they cannot experience racism. As Sayyid
(2008: 1) writes: “The ﬁgure of the Muslim is vital for this racism
without racists. Because Muslims are not a race, any and all forms
of discrimination and violence disproportionately directed at
them is thinkable and doable. Because Muslims are not a race the
systemic violations directed against them cannot be racially
motivated”. A by-product then of the “measured response” claim
is the suggestion that it is somehow acceptable to be Islamophobic
on the basis that the(ir) fear of a religion is genuine, logical and
non-racial. This not only deﬂects accusations of racism, but also
situates Islamophobes in a more favourable position.
To overcome this conceptual ﬂaw, this article uses the term
“anti-Muslim racism”, which is different to Islamophobia, to
more accurately describe the discriminatory dynamics of this
context. Here, the term “anti-Muslim racism” is used to describe a
type of hostility towards Muslims that uses cultural racism
(Modood, 1997: 4). This is a particular type of discrimination
against all those perceived to be Muslim, which is itself
determined by ideas about physical appearance (wearing of the
hijab or burqa), religious custom (prayer or observation of
Ramadan), and biological features (brown skin), which result in a
sense of post-colonial superiority over all those considered to be
Muslim. The term “anti-Muslim racism” emphasizes that racism
is not exclusively biologically determined, but that it is something
which is a socio-politically produced experience (Sayyid and
Vakil, 2010; Tyrer, 2013). Cultural racisms such as anti-Muslim
racism reproduce the idea that there are a hierarchy of cultures,
which in Western society means that “our” Western (or, British)
culture is superior to “their” Islamic (or, non-British) one. This
was most recently illustrated with the massive increase in reports
of anti-Muslim racism following Britain’s “Brexit” vote in 2016.
From the very start, the “leave” campaign relied heavily on a
convergence of anti-immigrant xenophobia and anti-Muslim
racism (despite the latter not having a logical relation to EU
membership). The ﬁrst simultaneously drew on and legitimated
the latter. Within the “socially fabricated distinctions between
Europeaness and non-Europeaness” (Sayyid, 2008: 1) lives the
persistent presence of the postcolonial fantasy!
In drawing on historical feelings of disgust towards Muslim
populations (Said, 1979), along with ideas about failed multi-
culturalism, a lack of community cohesion, and the need for
tighter border controls and national security (prevention of
terrorist activity1), nations have used “a narrative which connects
race with culture with multiculturalism with national identity
with community cohesion with wider social relations” around
crime and security (Patel, 2017: 3). This “logic” has resulted in
attempts to further control brown bodies at every possible level,
including the wearing of clothing often associated with Muslims.
For instance, in 2011, France banned the wearing of the Islamic
veil in public places. Punishable with ﬁnes of up to 150 Euros, the
2011 ban added to the 2004 ban on hijabs in France’s state
schools. Later, in 2016, a number of French towns banned the
wearing of a “burkini” (the term used in the media to refer to a
swimsuit that covers most of the body and which is mostly worn
by Muslim women). Reasons for the ban cited health concerns,
security issues, assimilation agendas, as well as gender equality
issues. Unsurprisingly, there has been a rise in the number of
reported racist attacks, which have speciﬁcally used visual
markers of Muslim-ness as a focus of hate, for example,
bearded men being attacked and (women especially) having
clothing forcibly removed or torn off (Allen, 2004; Mythen and
Khan, 2009; Carr, 2014). More recently, in March 2017, the
European Court of Justice ruled that companies could ban its staff
from wearing visible religious symbols whilst at work. Although
the ruling covered the wearing of symbols of any religion, it was
openly welcomed by those of the right of the political spectrum
who had been pre-occupied with women wearing Islamic
headscarves in the work place (The Guardian, 2017).
In the post-race state, visual markers (such as items of
customary dress) are seen as active choices, and this view allows
for victimization blame to be ﬁrmly laid at the feet of Muslims,
with the premise that they are responsible for actively choosing to
wear markers of difference and in doing so reject and offend
mainstream society. In other words, they are choosing to remain
uncivilized. Another consequence of this logic, is the rise of far-
right groups “from ‘street’ through ‘quasi-legitimate’ to ‘main-
stream’ [who have] found a greater platform from which to
publicize their views, messages and arguments” (Allen, 2004: 8).
Indeed, a number of newer emerging far-right groups have
speciﬁcally focused on the “Muslim threat”, for example, Pegida
(translated from German: Patriotic Europeans Against the
Islamization of the West). The visuality of Muslim-ness has
now come to be presented as incompatible and in contrast with
the “norms” of Western society (Allen, 2004: 12). Western society
taken here to mean civilized society. Furthermore, the perception
of Muslims as hostile and resistant to change further presents
them as the enemy within who pose a threat to our liberal way of
life (Fekete, 2004). This has allowed for debates about counter-
terror, immigration and citizenship to become blurred, with
policy on one being used to support the other. It has also allowed
for a revised narrative of the “white man’s burden” which
presents such attempts to control brown bodies as “a humanitar-
ian intervention…[which] only wants to spread democracy…to
domesticate unruly Muslims (Sayyid, 2008: 1).
Criminalizing muslims through counter-terror measures
For clarity, it is important I declare that this article does not
dismiss the fact that in recent years there have been a number of
terrible incidents in the United Kingdom and elsewhere which
have been carried out by groups and individuals declaring
themselves to be acting in the name of Islam, for instance, the
attacks in America in 2001, on London’s public transport system
in 2005, the Bali bombing in 2002, Madrid train bombings in
2004, Charlie Hebdo in 2015, and, the Tunisian beach attack in
2015. What this article challenges though is the use of anti-
Muslim racism to construct all or the majority of Muslims as
terrorists—either actual, potential or supporters of.
Counter-terror measures have been criticized for their over-
focus on all Muslims, and for their simplistic, generic and one-
dimensional notions of Islam (Kundnani, 2009; Pantazis and
Pemberton, 2009; Bonino, 2013; Patel, 2017). This has presented
the commonsensical view that extremism and radicalization is
inherent within Muslim culture. It is a logic that presents all
Muslims as extremists, rather than problematising the extremist
mind-set of individuals themselves. Anti-Muslim racism has seen
the state and its allied services construct Muslims through a
language of disobedience, deviance and criminality, which is itself
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considered to be built on anti-Western hostility and a history of
Orientalism (Said, 1979). Within the “war on terror” context, this
means that there is an easy acceptance in lay society of “the
dangerous brown man”—an adaptation of earlier racist mythol-
ogies around the “dangerous black man” (Bhattacharyya, 2008:
96), which is used to both represent and sustain racialized
anxieties. Rooted in these anxieties is the idea that Muslims are
uncivil, inferior and inhumane. This logic not only helps to justify
their unequal treatment in society, but also helps to ensure that
accusations of abuse and torture by the state are viewed with
relatively little sympathy. As Kundnani (2007: 126) notes, “to be a
“Muslim” in the “war on terror” is to belong to a group with
common origins, a shared culture and a monolithic identity that
can be held collectively responsible for terrorism, segregation and
the failure of multicultural Britain”. Muslims are not just seen to
be deviant or even criminal, but they are considered to be the
worse type of criminal—the fundamentalist terrorist, different to
comparatively humanistic terrorists of yester-year. The “Islamic
terrorist” indiscriminately targets all Western-civilians, including
it most vulnerable and precious: women and children.
Underpinned by older (immigration) concerns of “civilizing”
Muslim populations, newer counter-terror measures have allowed
for a wider-reaching remit of control of Muslims. It has done so
though, in a way that exudes a sense of urgency for extreme
deprivation measures and the enhanced surveillance of Muslims.
A number of legal measures have been introduced, which by
capitalizing on popular anti-Muslim sentiment, have over-
focused on Islamic terrorism. For instance, in the United
Kingdom, there was the extending of the 2000 Terrorism Act
(Home Ofﬁce, 2000), which actively designated Muslims as
dangerous, suspect and in need of control (Pantazis and
Pemberton, 2009: 652). The 2000 Act criminalised a range of
activities associated with a number of proscribed organizations,
which included supporting or attending meetings of said
organizations. Subsequent amendments to the 2000 Act increased
the number of proscribed organizations, with most newly added
organizations being associated with countries where Islam is the
main faith. There was also an extension of stop and search powers
under sections 44 and 45, allowing for practice to be undertaken
without the need for reasonable suspicion. Unlike the 1984 Police
and Criminal Evidence Act (Home Ofﬁce, 1984), the police
ofﬁcer did not need to have “reasonable suspicion” for the stop
and search2. The Act was later followed by the anti-Terrorism,
Crime and Security Act 2001 (Home Ofﬁce, 2001); the Prevention
of Terrorism Act 2005 (Home Ofﬁce, 2005); the Terrorism Act
2006 (Home Ofﬁce, 2006); the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008
(Home Ofﬁce, 2008); and, the Counter-Terrorism and Security
Act 2015 (Home Ofﬁce, 2015a). In combination, these Acts have
over-criminalized Muslim populations, and have made “legal”
their enhanced status as sources of risk and consequently their
vulnerability to victimization by the state, especially in relation to
police stop and search practices (Medina Ariza, 2013).
However, counter-terror measures allow for the criminalization
of Muslims to occur more widely and at a much earlier age. For
instance, consider the UK’s CONTEST strategy (Home Ofﬁce,
2011). Launched in 2003, and since revised, CONTEST claims to
work with “mainstream Islam” to “undermine extremist ideolo-
gies, identify and support individuals who are vulnerable to
recruitment, increase the capacity of communities to resist violent
extremists, and understand real and perceived grievances”
(McLaughlin, 2010: 105). CONTEST is split into four work-
streams: (i) Prevent—to stop people from becoming terrorists or
supporting terrorism; (ii) Pursue—to stop terrorist attacks; (iii)
Protect—to strengthen our overall protection against terrorist
attacks; and (iv) Prepare—to mitigate the impact of a terrorist
attack (Home Ofﬁce, 2011: 6). This article argues that CONTEST,
and other measures like it, are underpinned by a “civilizing”
narrative, for example, in its commitment to British values and
national security. This civilizing narrative draws on anti-Muslim
racism to perpetuate the idea of Muslims as a “suspect”
community—even in these post-race times! For instance, in
theory, CONTEST is directed at tackling all forms of radicalisa-
tion and extremism, including far-right activity, but in practice it
has heavily over-focused on the Muslim population (Coppock
and McGovern, 2014: 245).
This is most clearly illustrated under CONTEST’s Prevent
workstream. In consideration of the Counter-Terrorism and
Security Act 2015 (Home Ofﬁce, 2015a), the Revised Prevent
Duty Guidance (Home Ofﬁce, 2015b) states that educational
settings in the United Kingdom have a legal duty to prevent
young people from being drawn into terrorism. Part of this
involves an expectation that educational settings will promote the
“fundamental British values”, which are “… values of democracy,
the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and
tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs … Actively
promoting the values means challenging opinions or behaviour in
school that are contrary to fundamental British values”
(Department for Education, 2014: 5). The problem here is that
there is an over-emphasis on national and cultural supremacy,
which brings with it the danger of a biased and inaccurate
education. The teaching of “values” is not the point of contention,
rather it is the packaging of “democracy, rule of law, individual
liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance” as being essentially
British (white Western European) values. In addition, it
reinforces the perception of young Muslims being susceptible to
extremism, which counter-terror approaches then equate with
susceptibility to radicalization and terrorist activity, meaning that
young Muslims are “constituted as “vulnerable” in politically
powerful ways, as the “would-be terrorist” (Coppock and
McGovern, 2014: 242). Their “Islamic” and “child” selves are
both dangerous and in need of saving, and they become marked
as “appropriate objects for state intervention and surveillance”
(Coppock and McGovern, 2014: 242).
Rights Watch UK (2016) argues that Prevent’s effect on
education and the human rights of students, especially young
children, raises serious concerns3. This is because a by-product of
Prevent has been to create a generation of young British Muslims
who are fearful of exercising their rights to freedom of expression
and belief, which in turn impacts on the risk of forcing children to
discuss issues related to identity, religion and terrorism in unsafe
and problematic spaces, that is, the internet (Rights Watch UK,
2016: 4). Worse still, in the classroom and on campus, those with
very little training or background in crime prevention work,
let alone counter-terrorism work, have be tasked with the duty of
identifying and reporting on students expressing so-called
extremist views (Rights Watch UK, 2016: 4). It is not surprising
then that there have been claims that teachers have been “over-
enthusiastic” with this duty, leaving some children feeling as if
they have been targeted because of their faith and treated unfairly
in comparison to their white peers4. For example, data on Prevent
school referrals shows that between 2012 and 2013, 57.4%
referrals involved Muslims, despite the fact that (according to the
2011 Census) they make up only 5% of the national population
(Qurashi, 2016). Those educators who openly criticize Prevent’s
counter-terror measures come to be presented as problematic and
unhelpful to the national security agenda—for instance, consider
the backlash against the National Union of Teachers (NUT) and
Universities and Colleges Union’s (UCU) criticisms of Prevent
(NUT 2016; UCU, 2016).
In combination, these and other counter-terror measures draw
on somewhat normalized notions of the “Islamic terrorist” to
justify and gather support for discriminatory practices. They
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continue to construct Muslims as suspicious bodies with criminal
tendencies, in need of increased surveillance, control and
regulation, and thus “legitimise a pre-emptive, interventionist
and securitizing approach” (Coppock and McGovern, 2014: 242).
As Ansari (2004: 31) notes, this then serves to “terrorize the
Muslim community in Britain”. Each day, the Muslim commu-
nity have their social, religious and political activities observed,
interrogated and stigmatized, presented as suspect terror net-
works (Ansari, 2004: 31). Having “relegitimised state racism”
(Bhattacharyya, 2008: 75), counter-terror measures have also
“involved derogation from human rights provisions and estab-
lished elements of due process” (Rowe, 2012: 160). Any negative
impact that they may have on the Muslim population is
considered to be relatively justiﬁed, almost as collateral damage
in comparison to the perceived wider threat. In this sense,
Muslims are not considered worthy of human rights, they are
after all goes the civilizing logic, rejecting attempts to assimilate
and be part of Western civil society. This logic is not unique or
new to Muslims in post-colonial Britain. Recall for instance the
use of this logic in the treatment of other BMEs around the world,
for instance, Australia’s Aborigines, Native Americans, New
Zealand’s Maori, and the African Slaves transported across the
Atlantic. In all these cases, attempts were made to excuse and
justify exploitative behaviour on the basis that the (exploited)
subjects were naturally positioned, either biologically, intellec-
tually or in accordance to (the Christian) God’s plan, as inferior.
Thus, legitimized, morally at least, that the control of BME bodies
was necessary and good for society as a whole.
Civilizing, consuming and controlling brown bodies
Surveillance and control measures under counter-terror strategies
have without doubt drastically redeﬁned the lives and experiences
of Muslims. Under counter-terror measures, Muslims in
particular are presented as posing a crime and security threat.
In addition, the anti-Muslim rhetoric that underpins the counter-
terror logic presents Muslims, and brown bodies more generally
as incompatible and a threat to civil society, both morally and
legally. Consider for instance, the popularity of Donald Trump’s
Presidential campaign (illustrated not least with his win) in the
United States, which ran with the tagline of “Make America great
again”—a sentence which forces the voter to feel shame at having
lost a status of greatness, seemingly awakening them from their
zombie-like acceptance of overly liberal policies, and ﬁnally
delivering a rallying-cry for them to take action and regain their
status of greatness (by voting for Trump, in the ﬁrst instance).
Key parts of the campaign were delivered with such enﬂamed
anti-Muslim rhetoric that was never before seen in American
politics, not even in George W. Bush’s style of “cautious
Islamophobia”, or Barack Obama’s reference to Muslims within
a national security context. For example, Trump called for “a total
and complete shutdown of Muslims” entering the country
(Trump, 7 December 2015)5 and fought publicly with the Gold
Star Khan family (whose son Captain Humayun Khan died while
serving in Iraq in 2004), suggesting that Mrs Ghazala Khan was
not “allowed to speak” by her husband at the Democratic
convention because of their Muslim faith.
Within the counter-terror narrative runs a logic that presents
brown bodies as unable or unwilling in the least, to attain a
civilized state. They are seen as a threat to the social, moral,
religious and political order of Western society. This is the basis
of anti-Muslim ideology. This logic remains steadfast in the wider
imagination due to the persistence of a “post-colonial fantasy”.
This fantasy was created during imperial and colonial encounters,
and remains long in its de-colonized aftermath. During this time,
the “black Other” was seen as savage, sub-human and uncivilized.
Presenting the colonized subjects in this way, reafﬁrmed the
colonizers’ self-perception as morally and intellectually superior
—God-like almost, which allowed them to embark on rescue
missions to lift colonized subjects, usually through forced removal
and re-allocation of subjects, as in the case of Australia’s
Aboriginal children (the “Stolen Generations”) or African slavery
in America and its colonies. Of course, the “lifting” was never to
an equal or higher state, and always resulted in advancing the
economic position of the colonizers.
The post-colonial fantasy remains a form of institutionalized
power and systematic control over subjects of ex-colonies. Some
have argued that the fantasy, taken from a scholarly and artistic
perspective, evidenced an evolutionary movement because it
signiﬁed the West’s positive interest in other countries and
cultures. However, this form of exoticism has been critiqued given
that the interest was in reality superﬁcial and selective, not least
because it focused on the female colonial subject (Gindro, 2003:
112‒113). Therefore, there remained a selective othering of the
post-colonial subject which was ﬁltered through a Western
Imperialist gaze and misrepresented for its own satisfaction.
Hooks (1992) argues that such exoticism was especially applied to
lighter-skinned BMEs who are seen as being able to more safely
satisfy the Western male’ sexual desire and colonial fantasy,
in comparison to their darker-skinned, and thus animalistic
and savage counterparts. Unsurprisingly, male BME bodies,
especially the darker-skinned ones, have been constant victims of
colonial rule.
This article argues that male BME post-colonial subjects are
consumed in far less favourable ways. For instance, Boskin (1986,
cited in Moody-Ramirez and Dates, 2014: 17) notes how the use
of the “Coon”, “Jim Crow” and “Sambo” images in America,
especially as objects of laughter, sought to strip the black African
American male of his masculinity, dignity and self-respect—
qualities that would otherwise present him as a sexual competitor,
warrior and economic adversary. Similarly, consider the use of
sexual stereotypes about “the black man and his mythical penis”
which not only served to ridicule, but more actually indicated
“the insecurities of the powerful” (Bhattacharayya, 2008: 87–88).
Still, today there remains other examples of race-consuming
which highlights the persistence of the post-colonial mindset, for
instance, consider the “Black Pete” (Zwarte Piet) celebration in
the Netherlands, which despite criticisms have remained a core
celebration of Dutch culture (see van der Pijl and Goulordava,
2014). Indeed, artist and political activist, Spike Lee (quoted in
Ebert, 16 October 2000) argued that elements of “gangsta rap”
music videos, with their reference to “my ho’s” and “my bitches”,
can be held up as contemporary popularized examples of race-
consumption performance, namely minstrel performance, despite
their BME/black African-American artists and producers, because
there is an over-exaggerated, stereotypical, crude and ignorant
performance of blackness for the purpose of entertainment and
socio-political commentary.
Speciﬁcally, under the counter-terror pre-occupation, the post-
colonial mind-set re-uses established practices of “race-consump-
tion” to control brown bodies. Race-consumption within counter-
terror strategies occur in very much the same way, by stripping
the brown body of its human qualities. They are presented by the
media, politicians and news outlets as sexually deviant, insular
and intellectually limited. This representation permits brown
bodies to be consumed, that is for them to be stripped in the
white (Western European) imagination of their threatening
status, and for hierarchies of inferiority/superiority to remain in
place. The consuming of race in this sense then remains focused
on alleviating white fears and presenting BME populations as
(physically, intellectually and morally) inferior. As pre-colonized
subjects, brown bodies are rendered powerless through a
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continued colonial narrative, that is a representation and a forced
performance of colonial ideas about a supposed passive,
immature and animal-like character, and a “backwards” and
“oppressive” culture (Patel, 2017). For instance, consider the
presentation and discussion around brown families and commu-
nities, with presentations of them as abusive fathers/husbands
and subservient daughters/wives who come from insular and
backward cultures supposedly steeped in anti-Western views (see
Sian, 2012). Now, they have come to be represented as Muslim
radicals, Islamic extremists and terrorists, or at least sympathizers
of this ideology. Brown bodies are once again openly popularized
as unruly. Within the terrorist narrative, brown bodies are seen as
more dangerous, given that they are presented as an even more
dangerous type of terrorist, in comparison with the terrorist of
previous eras (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009). According to this
logic, Muslims need to be more closely watched, scrutinized and
controlled, even if this is at the sacriﬁce of their fundamental
human rights.
The race-consumption practice and post-colonial fantasy are
important features of the counter-terror narrative. In her analysis
of Muslim men and processes of deviant labelling within the “war
on terror” context, Bhattacharayya (2008) argues that popularized
racialized mythologies about “the dangerous Muslim man” have
come to embody “a dangerous hypermasculinity and a mutilated
deviation from proper manhood…portrayed as impenetrable,
secretive, enmeshed in an alien culture that inhabits the secret
places of an unsuspecting host society” (89). A variety of outlets
are used to construct the brown body in these ways. For instance,
the entertainment industry has a long history of locating the
brown body (or brown space) as villainous, who threatens
national security, freedom and civilization itself—a space only to
be neutralized by the white saviour/hero, for example, consider
the popular (1998) American ﬁlm, “The Siege” which relies
heavily on Muslim/Arab stereotypes of them as violent and ready
for martyrdom, and presents Islamic ritual practices within close
context of violent (terrorist) behaviour (Ameli et al., 2007: 36).
These images are found in more recent ﬁlms, whether it be subtly
such as in “Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles” (2014) with the evil
Foot Clans’ wearing of the Palestinian Kefﬁyeh scarf as part of
their military uniform, despite their original Japanese heritage
and non-Muslim/Arab connection, or more openly as in
“American Sniper” (2014) where not only are the American
soldiers the gloriﬁed heroes, but all the Iraqis are militant ﬁghters,
with the only non-militant civilian Iraqi being one family … who
are killed by Iraqi militants. Various news outlets, especially those
located in the centre-right of the political spectrum, have
delivered a constant barrage of “news stories” that have situated
the brown body in a dangerous position. Consider for example
the “Asian sex gangs” and “Asian groomer” stories that
dominated the British press in 2015 and 2016 (Patel, 2017),
where rather than presenting the abuse as an interplay between
gender and power, stories focused on the “Asian-ness” of the
abusers: “Vulnerable schoolgirl raped by at least 60 men after
being preyed upon by Asian grooming gang”, reported one
tabloid newspaper (Mirror, 18 May 2015), and “‘All white girls
are s**gs’: Asian sex gang found guilty of raping and sexually
assaulting three teenage girls in Rotherham”, reported another
(The Sun, 17 October 2016). These headlines were typical of
references made throughout the reporting of the child sexual
exploitation cases. More recently, social media has been used to
host anti-Muslim racism to a scale unimagined only 10 years ago,
for example, consider the volumous anti-Muslim rage that
dominated social media during Britain’s “Brexit” vote and
America’s presidential elections. This character-construction
(or, character-assassination) of the post-colonial subject has
ultimately justiﬁed the heightened surveillance and restrictions on
the human rights of those marked out brown. Society has gone
full-circle (again): having had a state of multiculturalism and
equality of opportunity, the narrative presented is that these have
been thrown back in our generous faces—we (by which I mean
white bodies) are the ones who have been exploited, and the result
is a state where the enemy lies within, unable to devoid itself of its
inherent and/or cultural dark traits, waiting to strike at the heart
of (Western and thus, natural) civilized order. Although
conceptually basic and proven to be problematic by a volume
of scholarly work, this narrative remains constant and danger-
ously powerful.
It is important to recognize that within the counter-terror
context, attempts to consume and control the brown body have
not gone unchallenged, especially by those experiencing ﬁrst-
hand anti-Muslim racism and the curtailed freedoms resulting
from counter-terror strategies. Consider for instance, one British
case, “Project Champion”, where a CCTV camera surveillance
system, funded by the Government’s “Terrorism and Allied
Matters Fund”6, was erected in neighbourhoods in the city of
Birmingham which were predominantly populated by Muslims.
Having been told that the system of 200 CCTV cameras was part
of a general crime-reduction strategy, in particular to protect
residents against vehicle crime, drugs offences and anti-social
behaviour, residents challenged the use of the cameras, noting its
negative impact on their human rights, as well as their broader
Islamophobic underpinnings (Awan, 2012; Iskajee and Allen,
2013; Patel, 2017). By June 2011, all the cameras had been
dismantled, and the case can be held up as a excellent example of
how community-level challenges in response to Islamophobic
over-surveillance measures can heighten instances of
victimization as well as hold ofﬁcials accountable for their
discriminatory behaviour. However, the case also highlights the
power and lived reality of contemporary counter-terror logic that
all Muslims are terrorists or, at the very least, potential terrorists,
as one resident said: “Whether we like it or not, we are the 7/7
bombers. We are the ones who bought down the twin towers. We
are Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden. That’s how people see us.
We’re the new Jews and we’re the new blacks” (Young Muslim
female interviewed in the aftermath of Project Champion, cited in
Isakjee and Allen, 2013: 752).
Concluding comments
The ready association of Muslims with terrorism has been
developed within a particular context largely emerging from
“‘War on Terror’ propagated by President Bush in the aftermath
of 11 September 2001 attacks, co-joined by Blair, and continued
in practice, if not on political rhetoric, by their respective
successors” (Rowe, 2012: 159). This has resulted in “an uncritical
and simple-minded acceptance of the notion of a ‘new’ kind of
‘religious terrorism’” (Jackson, 2009: 177), which has in turn
allowed for the closer scrutiny of all Muslims and an acceptance
of limited human rights. It is argued that the presentation of the
“Muslim-terrorist”, or “Muslim super-villain” (Sayyid, 2008: 1)
has been so readily digested because of the civilizing narratives
found in the old-racism of previous-eras, that is, Said’s (1979)
Orientalism. The re-presentation of brown bodies as problematic
draws on ﬁrmly established practices of “race-consumption”,
popularized in recent history during imperialism and colonialism,
where brown bodies were presented as uncivil, inferior and
inhumane, and thus in need of enlightenment and governing.
In drawing on a post-colonial fantasy and established practices
of race-consumption, this article critiques the claim that we are
now living in a post-race state. Rather it argues that the fallacy the
post-race condition actually serves to perpetuate and excuse anti-
Muslim hostility. Anti-Muslim sentiment has once again become
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popularized, fashionable almost, and certainly considered an
acceptable basis upon which the political agenda can be shaped. It
is clear that aside from not living in a truly post-race era, there is
currently the normalization of anti-Muslim racism and a range of
formal measures that victimize members of the Muslim
population are commonplace. This supports the idea that what
we have is actually a not yet post-race state. More so, the ease with
which anti-Muslim racism powerfully permeates society suggests
that there will never truly be a post-race state.
Notes
1 The counter-terror strategy has been widely supported and is often used to galvanize
support for restrictions on human rights of Muslim populations. This is despite the
fact that “the evidentiary narrative of this popular [counter-terror] narrative” is poor—
death from Islamic terrorist activity is still relatively low in comparison to say deaths
caused by state repression, global warming, disease, small arms (Goodin, 2006, cited in
Jackson, 2009: 175).
2 In January 2010, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that stop and search
powers within section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000, were in violation of Article 8
(regarding privacy rights) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court
also noted the potential for discriminatory abuse under section 44.
3 In particular: “The right to freedom of expression, which holds the freedom to hold,
receive, and impart information and ideas without interference”; “The right to freedom
of thought, conscience, and religion”; “The right to education”; “The right to privacy”;
“The right to enjoy other rights free from discrimination on grounds such as religion,
or political or other opinion”; and “The right, for children, to have their best interests
as the primary consideration where any public body takes any action concerning
them” (European Convention on Human Rights, 1953: section 1).
4 At time of writing, the National Union of Teachers had backed a motion to reject the
Prevent strategy, citing that it targets Muslim students, despite the government’s claim
that the strategy targets all forms of extremism (Qurashi, 2016).
5 Following Trump’s inauguration as President of the United States of America in
January 2017, he introduced an Order which barred for 90 days people from seven
predominantly Muslim countries from entering the United States: Iran, Iraq, Libya,
Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. The order also banned all refugees for 120 days, and
Syrian refugees indeﬁnitely.
6 This fund provides grants for projects that seek to deter or prevent terrorist activity or
help to prosecute those responsible for terrorism.
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